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IN TilE SUPRE~IE COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAII, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 15654 
JOHN EARL Hc~IILLAtl, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPOtlDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged by information of 
committing the crimes of Forcible Sodomy, a first degree 
felony in violation of S 76-5-403, U.C.A., 1977, Supp., and 
rorci~l~ Sexual ~husc, ~ thir~ de1ree felony in violation of 
DISPOSITION IN TilE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury before the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary, in the Third Judicial District Court. 
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The appellant was found guilty on all counts charged in 
the information. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the convictior 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 5, 1977, Bryson (age 4) and Anson Jack, 
(age 3) , and Becky (age 4) and Kirk (age 3) Harpole were 
playing outside near a home that was being constructed in 
their neighborhood. (T. 40). As the children approached 
the house, they saw a man in the loHer level of the house 
who was unzipping his pants (T. 27). The man told the 
children to "Come here," (T. 28, 1. 2) which they did. At 
that time, three of the children "tasted" and "felt" his 
penis (T. 28). The fourth child, Kirk, did the same a few 
moments later (T. 29). 
Mrs. Harpole testified that the new home was 
approximately 175 feet fror:1 her Y:itchC'n \·:inclo<·.'. (T. 40). 
Prior to the incirl~r:.t, I1rs. ti-l.rJ)cl; ~~:~:. 'L\t ~ L t_ ,.',1 1 1 c· . 
"by a man by the side of the house 
were talking." (T. 40 l. 17, 19). 
. it looY:ed liY:e they 
(T. 40) At that time 
she also observed an older model red true}: nci1r the home. ( T. 
-2-
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1':cs. EarfJole hollered out the HindoVI for the children to 
come home, and in about ten minutes, after they had failed 
to resnoncl and she was unable to see them, she Hent over to 
the horne to get them. (T. 41). At this time, the red truck 
Has gone. (T 42). As Mrs. Barpole approached the garage 
area of the ne1-1 home, she hollered for the children again. 
(T. 42). As the children came out of the house, Anson Jack 
told her, "that man sh01.•ed us his \'/eenie. lie let us feel it, 
and we tasted it and it tasted yukky." (T. 43, 1. 13). 
Mrs. Harpole went over to the Jack residence, 
where she told Mrs. Jack what had occurred. (T. 43). 1'. 
fe~-; r,inutes later, the mothers 1-:ent out Hith the children 
to the Bookmobile, at which time they had an opportunity to 
observe the nan identified by the children, the same man 
Hrs. Harpole had observed Hith the children by the side of the 
house. (T.44,45). The mothers also noted the license 
number on the red truck. (T. 4 5). 
Bryson told her l·:h:.:tt hilcl occurrecl. (T. 53, 54). She also 
testified that she notified Deputy Russell Sanderson of the 
incident. ('1'. 58) Mrs. Jilek described the suspect and the 
-3-
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A. He said, 'That man showed us his 
weenie. ile let us feel it, and we tasted 
it and it tasted yukky.' 
Q. What did you do after you hearc.1 
those words? 
A. The children and I v1alked down tl1f' 
sidewalk, which was there, went over to 
Anson's mother's home." 
The record offers no indication as to why the trial 
judge ruled as he did. However, by stating thut the statemcr.: 
was admissible "not for the truthfulness of what is said, but 
that it was S"-l 43, 1. 4, 5), it is known that the 
judge admitted t~e testimony as non-hearsay. State v. Sibert 
6 Ut. 2d 198 31G P. 2d 388, (1957), l'i'igmore on J::viocnce, JC1., 
·val. VI. § 1766 states: 
"If, therefore, an extrajudicial utterance 
is offered, not as an assertion to evidence 
the matter asserted, but without reference to 
the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay 
rule do~s not apply." 
Later, in § 1790 Wigmore states that: "On the principle 
of multiple admissibility, if there's any relevant circurnstan· 
us~, the utt2rance is etdrnissihlc-, for t-~~t rur~~0c:•·." 
-' .:.; ·-) ·~ 
have been admitted as non-hearsay. 
"Utterances servin<J to mark a time• or 
a place are the commonest instances of 
this sort, and are admissible so f~r 
-6-
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as they have a real service for that 
purpose and are not merely used as a 
pretext for introducing a hearsay 
assertion." lhgmore, 3d. ed., Vol. VI., 
fj 1791. 
The statement was also admissible to specify the grounds for 
the witness' knowledge and recollection. Wigmore, 3d. ed., 
Vol. II, fj 655. 
Anson's statement served to mark a point in time 
for Mrs. ~arpole. It also gave her a reason to make an effort 
to fix in her mind the description of the man she had seen 
earlier at the home. At that point in time, she also made 
an effort to make a specific identification of the truck. 
The statement also serves to explain Mrs. Harpole's subsequent 
act of notifying Mrs. Jack, as well as her general concern 
that led to the questioning and arrest of the appellant by 
Deputy Sanderson. 
The State had the obligation to establish a prima 
facia case before the confession of the appellant could be 
All of the things that Mrs. Harpole 
portant to the State as circumstantial evidence in establis~ing 
;: rrin,a facio cuse agilinst the appellant. 
-7-
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POINT B. 
THE STATE~IENT \vAS ALSO AD~liSSIBLE 
AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE 
UNDER THE '<.ES GES"'AS TllEO~\T. 
The record reflects that prior to the incident 
Mrs. Harpole saw the four children playing near the new 
home through her kitchen window, some 175 to 200 feet away, 
and "that they were by a man by the side of the house." 
(T. 40). About 5 to 10 minutes later, after hollering out 
the window for th 0 children to come home, (T. 41), she went~ 
to the house to get them. (T. 42). As she approached the 
garage area of the home, the children came out of the home 
and she called to them. (T. 42). Thee first commccnt that any 
of the children made to her, without any inquiry on her part, 
was Anson's statement: "That man showed us his weenie. He 
let us feel it, and we tasted it and it tasted yukky." 
(T. 43, l. 13, 14). 
The doctrine of res gestae is recognized by Rule 63 
c I 
for admission frequently stated. l·ligrnore stat0s tlw re-
quirements as being: (1) a startling occasion, and 
-R-
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(2) a statement made before ti~e to fabricate, (3) relating 
to the circumstances of the occurrence. Wigmore on Evidence, 
3cl. ec1. , § 17 50. In Cro~cenes v. San Pedro, Los Angeles, 
and Sctlt Lake Hailroad Cumpur,·;, J7 utith ,175, 109 P. 10, 
(1910), Chief Justice Straup stated in his concurring opinion 
the majority position of the Court regarding limitations 
on re3 gestae statements: 
"(1) The declaration or utterance must 
be spontaneous or instinctive, (2) it 
must relate to or be connected with a main 
or principal event or transaction itself 
material and admissible in evidence; and 
(3) it must have been the result or product, 
the outgrowth, of the immediate and present 
influences of the main event, or preceding 
circumstances, to which it relates, and it 
must be contemperaneous wfth it and tend to 
explain or elucidate it." 109 P. at 18. 
1 The appellant, at page 4 of his brief, has cited the 
minority position on the res gestae issue in the 
Cromeenes case. Alt~oush the statement was included 
in the main opinion, a careful reading of the 
case indicates that 2 members of the 3 man court 
disagreed with this part of the main opinion, and 
expressed their definition of the standards in the 
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Straup. In 
? ~ 1 ~:-i')l"'., ~' l-~l_~Ot::. z·~ .::;c"'~-.t~t-L;--_,~: i:: Lhr ClP£-"'C::ll'-;nts 
L -· 1 ' l ~ . ' -. ~· .. r 
( I'--'~:-- 't ~' ; J ~: C-" ~ ':~ ,_. ~ s \_~ ',.; l """"~- <._:: • ~' ' :: ~ ~ -;_ C! l ~: i :1 s . 
should be: "here they the facts tc1lking . 
Sec 109 P. at 15, and Leach v. Oregon Short Line, 
29 Ut. 28'), 81 P. 90. (1905). 
--<1-
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In a subsequent paragraph, Chief Justice Straup noted that 
"The word 'contemporaneous' is not taken literally, and that 
time is not the real governing factor in the cleter~ination, 
but is only important in determining whether the statement 
was spontaneous and intimately connected with the main 
transaction, and was n-:-onpted. or rroduced by its if11l11ediate 
and present influences." 109 P. at 18. 
The purpose of the res gestae exception is to 
allow into evidence statements that would not otherwise 
be admissible because of the defendant's inability to actuall~ 
cross-examine the person that made the statement. The 
Washington Supreme Court, in Johnston v. Ohls., 457 P. 2d 
at 194, (1969), stated the key res gestae issue in a succinct 
manner: 
"The crucial question in all cases is 
whether the statement was made while the 
declarant was still under the influence 
of the event to the extent that his 
statement could not be the result of 
fabrication, intervening actions, or the 
ex£>rciSt::.::! of cho"i.-::e: o:- j 1 ~\ 1 c;er~";; ~ .. '' ?r] l'l'J. 
derived from other cases that do not apply to the factual 
situation in the case before them. Some courts have address!': 
themselves to this particular nroblens, as did the Arizona 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court in State v. Finley, 85 Az. 327, 338 P. 2d 790, (1959): 
"It is clear from our previous pronouncements 
that: (1) it is impossible to formulate a 
definition of res gestae which will serve 
~or .111 cc:F.cs: (2) :C'l rt2le !'1'1\' be forf"ulated 
as to the limit of time withi~ which the 
exciting cause should be held to have been 
dissipated so as to render such statement 
inadmissjble; (3) a \vant of suitable op-
portunity, or fear, may sometimes excuse or 
justify a delay in making the disclosure; 
and (4) each case nust depend upon its own 
facts and much must be left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court." 338 P. 2d 
at 794. 
This rationale coincides with that of the Utah courts as it 
was stated in Balle v. Smith, 81 Ut. 179, 17 P. 2d. 224 at 
232, (1932) and cited in Norton v. Hood, 105 Ut. 484, 143 
P. 2d 43~ at 438 (1943). "The trial court has wide discretion 
in the admissions of declarations of this character, and should 
be fully satisfied by evidence that a statement claimed to 
be res gestae comes within the rule and meets all the 
requirements thereof . 
Many courts have relaxed res gestae requirements 
1 '-; 
was too young to appear. 83 l\LR 2d 1372. The record reflects 
that at the time of trial, the declarant, Anson Jack, was 
-11-
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four years of age. (T. 52). The record also reflects 
that Anson's statement was made within a few minutes 
after the event occurred. (T. 42), and was not made in 
response to any question. 
that the declarant was of such a tender age that it is 
inherently improbable that his stat8nent v~s invented in the 
short period of time between the alleged incident and his 
communication of it to Hrs. Harpole. See State v. rtcFall, 
75 S.D. 630,71 NW 2d 299, (1955), Beausoliel v. U.S., 107 F. 
2d 292, (D.C. Cir. 1939). The appellant argues that since 
the declarant was not emotionally excited or upset, the 
declaration lacks spontaneity. Other courts have dealt 
with this problem and attributed the lack of visible 
emotional trauma to the youthfulness of the victims. In 
State v. Hutchinson, 222 Ore. 533, 353 P. 2d 1047. (1960), 
a five year old boy was sexually assaulted in the defendant's 
trailer home, a short distance from his parent's home. 
Within three or four minutes of seeing his parents after the 
incident, t.he '·ict...i.rct bJur+_t'd 0··+--: 
Momray." 353 P. 2d at 1049. The boy v:a~; I•cither upset nor 
agitated at the time, and was not offered as a witness. 
-] 2-
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At trial, the mother related the declaration ever the 
defendant's hearsay objection. The court recognized his 
lack of excitement by stating: 
"7he lit~le fellow, according to 
what he told his parents, and likewise 
according to what the defendant described 
in his confession, had undergone an 
experience in the =efendant's trailer 
house diffErent fron what children encounter 
in the little world in which they live." 
353 P. 2d at 1052. 
The Oregon court approved the admission of the res gestae, 
and affirmed the conviction. In Beausoliel, supra, the child 
was not at all agitated; in fact, the mother questioned the 
child only after noting a "peculiar expression" on her face. 
107 F. 2d at 294. The mother was allowed to testify as to 
what the child related in response to her queries as part 
of the res gestae. 
The test to be applied in determining whether a 
statement is part of the res gestae is not whether the child 
is visibly excited or upset, or how much time has elapsed; 
'. t~r·:- 'l. · r ..._ '- cc· l-,.--. :· L l;~~ for deliberation or reflection. 
In this case, the declarant (1) encountered a startling 
event, and (2) made an unsolicited statement to Mrs. Harpole, 
-13-
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the first adult he saw after the event, as soon as he saw 
her and within a few minutes after the occurrence of the 
event, (3) rel?ting the facts of the event. The statement 
was admissible as part of the res gestae. 
Another issue to be dealt with is whether the 
incompetency of the declarant at the time of the utterance 
affects the admissibility of the statement. Courts that hav€ 
considered this issue have found in favor of admissibility. 
See Heflin v. State, 274 S.l'i. 2d 681, (Tex Cr., 1955), 
Johnston v. Ohls, supra, State v. Boodry, 96 Az. 259, 394 
P. 2d 196 (1964). It is unknown whether Anson would have 
been found competent to testify. It is known, however, that 
he was merely 4 years old at the time of the trial, and 
presumably incompetent at the time of the incident. 
In view of the fact that each case must be 
considered on its own circumstances, Finley, supra; Langford 
v. State, 312 So. 2d 65, (Ala. Cr. 1975), and State v. 
Sanders, 27 U. 2d 354, 496 P. 2d 270, (1972) cited by the 
alone. 
the testimony was improperly admitted, it did not find 
prejudicial error and upheld the conviction. In a later 
-111-
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case, Brooks v. State, 329 So. 2d 167, (1976), the Alabama 
court limited the Langford decision to the facts, and 
recognized soontaneity as qualifying a statement within 
the res gestae rule. (329 So. 2d at 169). In Sanders, 
supra, the defendant contended that hearsay statements 
made by an alleged participant were admissible under Rule 
63 (4) (b), Utah Rules of Evidence. The statements consisted 
of a description of the robbery made to a third person 
several hours after the crime occurred, and their admission 
was properly limited at trial. 
Assuming that the statement was part of the 
res gestae, then not only the fact that the statement was 
made, but its contents were admissible. State v. Beaudin, 
136 P. 137, (\·:ash., 1913), State v. Ch2:1ey, 134 Neb. 734, 
171 IL\v. 2d 737, (1969). In State v. Imlay, 61 P. 557, 
(Utah, 1900), the court stated that where the utterance was 
part of the res gestae, 
not only evidence of the complaint, 
2_(.. __ 
n ~: - - •-:''.- ~ :, 
~enerally received for corrobordting the 
evidence of the prosecutrix, but not as 
substantive testimony, to prove the com-
mission of the offense." 61 P. at 558. 
-15-
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The complainant had testified previously, and parts of 
his testimony had been impeached. The Court reviewed 
the problem and came to the following conclusions: 
"It is not every instance in 
which a witness relates what he heard 
someone else say that he is purporting 
to represent that the state~ent he 
heard is true. The purpose of his 
testimony may be simply to prove that 
someone else made a statement without 
regard to whether it be true or false. 
Testimony of this nature does not 
violate the hearsay rule since the 
witness is asserting under oath a 
fact he personally knows, that is, 
that the statement was made, and he 
is subject to cross-examination con-
concerning that fact." 
Mrs.Jack's relation of Bryson's story may be viewed in 
this context. The statement served to mark a point in 
time, and to explain her subsequent actions. It also 
serves to show that a complaint was in fact made. 
The testimony is also admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 63 (l) (c) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
"!\. pri_o-~- stat~_:r,,~nf-:.. C)i ~' 
wi tn·2S3, if the· j Ll(;r_Jc~ [ inds t11,1t 
the witness had an adequate opportunity 
to perceive the event or condition which 
his statement narrates, describes or 
explains, provided that:. (c) it 
will support testimony made by the 
witness in the present case when such 
testimony has been challenged." 
-18-
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There can be little doubt that the appellant challenged 
the testimony of Bryson on cross-examination (T.35,37,38). 
The Sibert Court continued its niscussion of 
hearsay and non-hearsay stating: 
"lve think the better view 
is that where there has been an 
attempt to impeach or discredit 
a witness, prior statements 
consistent with his present 
testimony may be offered to offset 
the impeachment. Such procedure 
has previously been approved by 
this court." 310 P.2d at 391. 
At page 392, the Court concluded: 
"Insofar as Officer Ferrin's 
testimony actually supported the 
parts of Butters' testimony upon 
which impeachment was attempted, 
that is, as to the color and model 
of the robber's car, his evidence was 
properly admitted as rehabilitating 
testimony." 
Mrs. Jack was not serving as a mere conduit for the 
testimony of Bryson. He had already testified as to the 
facts of the incident, and he was challenged as to the 
to rehabilitate Bryson's testimony. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this testimony was 
improperly admitted, it does not constitute prejudicial 
error requiring reversal. This testimony was merely 
-]C)-
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cumulative of Mrs. Harpole's testimony. In addition, 
the appellant's admissions made to Deputy Sanderson, and 
admitted at trial, corroborate Mrs. Jack's testimony as 
to the acts that Bryson told her occurred, with the single 
exception of the oral sodomy. 
The second objection appellant raises on 
appeal regards the testimony of Mrs. Jack as to Bryson's 
extrajudicial identification of the appellant: 
"Q. Did Bryson tell you 
so~ething about that man? 
A. I asked him, I said, 
'Which one was it?' 
MR. JOHNSTON: Objection 
to this testimony, your Honor, 
on the grounds it's hearsay, 
what he told her. 
THE COURT: The objection 
is overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Marson) Go 
ahead. 
A. He told me which man 
it was. 
Q. Now, is the man Bryson 
pointed to in the courtroom today? 
A. Yes, he lS. 
Q. Point him out, please. 
A. This gentleman riqht here. 
0. I·l;l~' the recorc1 r l:flpr·t 
tbat- thn ·::_::::'""c '<1-:-l:t h-:1:-:; }' ':1 
iCie?ntific:c1 by th1.s \·,ritnr?.:.Js'! 
THE COURT: The record may 
so show." (T. 55, 1.24-30, T. 
56, l. 1-8.) 
In People v. Gould, 7 Cal.R. 273, 354 P.2o 865 
(1960), the victim was unable to identify the people 
-?.0-
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that robbed her at the time of the trial. In approving 
testimony of her extrajudicial identification, the 
court stated the following: 
"Evidence of an extra 
judicial identification is 
admissible not only to corroborate 
an identification made at the 
trial, but as independent evidence 
of identification. Unlike other 
testimony that cannot be corroborated 
by proof of prior consistent state-
ments unless it is first impeached 
[citations omitted], evidence of an 
extra judicial identification is 
admitted regardless of whether the 
testimonial identification is 
impeached, because the earlier 
identification has greater probative 
value than an identification made in 
the court room after the suggestions 
of others and the circumstances of 
the trial may have intervened to create 
a fancied recognition in the witness 
mind." 354 P.2d at 867. 
In Gallegos v. People, 157 Colo. 484, 403 P.2d 
864 (1965), the Court discussed this issue and stated: 
"As an exception to the hearsay 
rule, its application has been extended 
to the admission of the testimony of a 
t hi ~-c1 per~:c1n t,-;l:·J he:n-0 or obst~rt·cd th9 
:: L- 1- :~ J " 1 : .:__· : l. _: -i .._ 1 ·~· : l :.:: f ~- i c ;:• l i :.. ) .:-: u r-l '~ c r 
'--..(,~J-;-ic;,, _ (-, iCJ.: [-.·itc:l-::-io:!:-; u:· it::-:cJ], ar,cl 
admissibility is particularly sanctioned 
in cases where the identifier testifies 
at trial [citations omitted]." 403 P.2d 
at 869. 
Sec also _sta~'- .'-'_. _ _!'incl_!_ing, 123 Mn. 413, 144 N.W. 142 (1913), 
ancl _5ta_t_e_\!_·_I-1c~c;}o_y, 127 Mont. 265, 261 P.2d 663 (1953). 
-21-
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The Utah Court has not addressed this specific 
issue. However, in State v. Underwood, 25 Utah 2d 234, 
479 P.2d 794 (1971), the Court approved the testimony of 
the victims as to their extrajudicial identification of 
the accused. 
The problems presented by the youthfulness of 
the victims pervade each issue that has been advanced in 
this appeal. It is improbable that a three or four year 
old child would be able to identify any offender at a 
later date. In the case at bar, one of the victims, 
Bryson,pointed the appellant out to his mother within 
an hour after the act occurred. This identification, and 
his identification the next day in conjunction with the 
arrest of the appellant by Deputy Sanderson (T.71), are 
inherently more reliable than any later identification 
he might attempt to make. Furthermore, the appellant had 
ample opportunity to question ~lrs. Jack as to her 
identification of the appellant hascd on what she w~s told 
day of the crime. 
-22-
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POINT III 
BRYSON JACK WAS COMPETENT TO 
TESTIFY AT TRIAL. 
The TJtah Court has consistently held that 
the admission of the testimony of a child under the 
age of ten lies within the sound discretion of the 
court, and will not be reversed unless there is a 
clear abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 16 
Utah 2d 374, 401 P. 2d 445 (1965); State v. Zeezich, 
61 Utah 61, 210 P.2d 927 (1922). In so holding, 
the court recognizes the advantaged position of the 
trial judge in determining these matters, resulting from 
his proximity to the trial. State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 
361 P.2d 174 (1961); Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 
(1895). 
The test to be used by the trial judge in 
determining competency of the witness is set forth in 
Smith, supra, 401 P.2d at 447: 
"\·.7 h~1t j s ,;:.::;~entiu.l is that it 
'-t:JI) -·.1:__· i J.~l.~, t'.•.-· c:1_i lJ h .. =ts suf-:icient 
i ;1t '-' ~ . .Li ;.__ _ _;;:::__:~.':- --~J!d I".atu_;_-i ty thclt she 
is able to understand the questions 
put to her; that she has some knowledge 
of the subject under inquiry and the 
facts involved therein; that she is 
able to remember what happened; and 
th~t she has a sense of moral duty to 
tell the truth." 
-23-
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Prior to allowing Bryson to testify, Judge 
Leary conducted an examination of the child to 
determine his competency as a witness (T.l7-23). The 
examination revealed that Bryson was five years of age 
and attended Monte Vista School in South Jordan (T.l7). 
The judge inquired several times if Bryson knew what it 
meant to tell the truth, and the consequences of telling 
a lie: 
"THE COURT: Now, you look like 
a young boy that has learned a lesson 
that you're to tell the truth; isn't 
that right? 
BRYSON JACK: Yes. Yes. 
THE COURT: And when I say 
that you're to tell the truth what 
does that mean to you? 
BRYSON JACK: It means tell 
what's supposed to tell, like if you 
did something and Mom tells you what 
you did you say 'I did it.'" (T.l8, 
1. 18-26). 
"THE COURT: Now, tell me what 
happens to young boys that tell 
lies. Do you know? 
BRYSON JACK: They get spankings." 
(T.l9). 
occasions, as noted by the appellant in his brief at 
page 10 and 11, the clear import when the pre-trial inter-
view is considered as a whole is that Bryson knew the 
difference between a truth and a lie, and that he would 
be punished if he lied. 
-24-
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At the close of the Judge's examination of 
Bryson, the appellant moved to have him disqualified as 
a witness. The motion was denied by the trial judge (T.23). 
The appellant also notes that Bryson apparently 
contradicted himself on cross-examination (T.35,37,38), and 
that this rendered him incompetent to testify. The nature 
of the questions posed by the appellant would have been 
confusing to any witness, especially a five year old. 
Defense counsel's indiscriminate use of double and triple 
negatives undoubtedly resulted in confusing the witness. 
However, the mere fact that the witness was temporarily 
confused does not render him incompetent. 
When considered as a whole (see appendix), Bryson's 
testimony on direct and cross-examination reflects that 
(1) he understood the questions put to him, (2) he had 
personal knowledge of the incident complaint of, (3) 
he was able to recall and relate that knowledge, and (4) he 
knew what it meant to tell the truth. Indeed, Bryson's 
defendant's own admission to Deputy Sanderson. Under 
the test advanced by this court in State v. Smith, supra, 
Bryson Jack was a competent witness. 
CONCLUSION 
In determining the issues raised on appeal, 
it is impcratjv0 that the Court recoqnizc that this was a 
-25-
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non-jury trial. While this does not ~ean th~t the 
rights of the defendant are less significant, this 
Court has recognized on several occasions that, "where 
the trial is to the court, tll~ rulinj:; UiJOn u::;,i:;:-;i:~il ity 
of evidence are not required to be so strict, nor are 
they of such critical i~portance as where the trial is to 
the jury." Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 
p. 2d 811 ( 19 7 2) • It is presumed that the trial jud9e 
will disregari t~.~ inadmissible, and where there is 
competent evidence to support the result, the improper 
admission of evidence will not cause reversal. 
McCormick on Evidence, 1972 ed., § 60. 
The appellant raises clai~s of several errors 
on the part of the trial court in admitting hearsay 
testimony. Although it is not clear in each instance, 
the testimony was generally admitted not for the truth 
of the statement, but merely to show that the statements 
were made. In each instance, the tcsti~ony would also 
There was antplc cvHic:nc,, pres, ltLC'u al L1 ial 
to establish a prima facie case aCJainsL th" appccllant, 
thereby allowing the judge to consider the appcl L1nt 's 
own admissions. 
-26-
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The only charges not substantiated by the 
appellant's admissions relate to the oral sodomy counts. 
The testimony of Bryson, rehabilitated by his mother, 
and l>~JS0:1' s spontaneous declaration, all properly 
admitted, support the court's finding of guilt. 
The competency of Bryson Jack is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. The 
judge, during the course of a preliminary examination 
of Bryson, established that he knew what it meant to 
tell the truth and the consequences of lying. This 
fact, and his testimony when considered as a whole, 
indicate that the court was not clearly erroneous 
in its decision to accept Bryson's testimony. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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- --------~A~P~PLE~N~D~Ix~----------------------------~ 
He might not want to talk th~t loud. 
2 (Whereupon, BRYSON JACK, called as a witness by coun-
3 sel for the State, and having previously been admonished 
4 by the Court as herein transcribed, assumed the witness 
5 stand under examination as follows:) 
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. ~!ARSON: 
b 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
(l 
What's your name? 
Bryson. 
Bryson what? 
Jack. 
How old are you? 
Five. 
Five? 
Yes. 
Are you in school? 
Yes. 
What grade are you in? 
Kindergarten. 
Do you know who your teacher is? 
Yes, Mrs. Anderson. 
Do you like her? 
24 Q. lvhat do they teach you in school? 
25 A. About Indians. 
2G Q. HhLlt do you learn about Indians? 
27 A. About Indians and Indian clothes. 
28 Q. Do you like that? 
29 A. Yes. 
:w Q. How mdll)' brothers and sisters do you 
Rn\\'AHn P Mlnr.I.RY HPR 
have? 
24 
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1 A. Four. 
2 Q. Four? 
3 A. I only have one baby sister, and I have two 
4 brothers. 
5 Q. One baby sister and two brothers? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. One of your brothers is outside of the courtro~ 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. What's his name? 
10 A. Anson. 
11 Q. Do you like him? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Do you like your daddy? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Is your daddy in the courtroom? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What does your daddy do? 
18 A. Sells wallets. 
19 Q. What kind of wallets? 
20 A. Prince Gardiner. 
21 Q. Yeah? Does your daddy go in airplanes? 
22 A. Yes. 
i\. Ye:::.. 
25 Q. Bryson, do you know what the truth is? 
26 A. Yes, 
27 Q. Are you going to tell the truth right now? 
28 A. Yes. 
29 Q. See the Judge there? 
:10 A. Yes. 
--------EDWAHO P. MIDGLEY, Hl'lt 
A l"\7 COlH~T<; Rill I DltJ<. 
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------------------------
D You promised the Judge you'd tell the truth? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. What does your daddy do to you if you 
4 don't tell the truth? 
5 A. Spanks me. 
6 Q. Do you like that? 
7 A. No. 
Q. Okay. Bryson, do you remember a day a long time 
9 ago you and Becky and Anson and Kirk went to the house? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. .l~hat house are we talking about; near your 
12 house? 
13 A. This house--this white house that's been built. 
14 Q. Now, was it being built at the time? 
15 A. Yeah. 
16 Q. Who did you go to that house with? 
17 A. Becky and Kirk and Anson. 
18 Q. And you? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. When you came to that house did you see something? 
21 A. Yeah, I saw the man. 
Q. What did you sec the man doing? 
25 A. Opening his pants. 
Opening his pants? 
A. Opening his pants. 
Q. Did Becky say so~cthing at that time? 
NR. JOHNSTON: Objection to that on the grounds that 
:w i L' s J r· acl i n<J, your Honor. 
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1 
2 
THE COURT: Just a minute--. 
A. (By the witness) Becky said that, and then he 
3 unzipped his pants. 
4 THE COURT: I think that perhaps you ought to ask thE 
5 question, please, and not have him relate it from--
6 
7 
3 
MR. MARSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: --memory. Ask him the questions. 
Q. (fly Mr. harc:on) 
9 happened? 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
He unzipped his pants and showed us. 
Unzipped his pants. Now, where were you childn 
12 standing? Where was he? Do you remember, Bryson? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
:10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yeah, right beside of the window. 
Looking through the window? 
Yes. 
What did he do when he unzip~ed his pants? 
Pulled his weenie out. 
His weenie? 
Yes. 
Do you know what a weenie is? 
No. 
THE COURT: What was his ans1ver? 
l[rJ. 
• I ... 
A. (Indicating) 
MR. MARSON: May the record reflPct he's pointing tc 
his crotch area? 
THE COURT: It may so show. 
Q. (By Mr. Marson) l\nd what happcno. when he pulle: 
his weenie out? Then what did you c1o tlif•n? 
A. He--I saw it. 
EDWARD P MIDGLEY, HPH 
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3: I .... 
I he 
4 
~ What happened then? 
~ Then he said, "Come here." We went on down, and 
was on the stairs. And--. 
MR. JOHNSTON: Objection to that, your Honor, and re-
5 quest it be stricken. 
6 THE COURT: I didn't hear his answer. You'll have to 
1 read it back for me. 
8 (\'/hereupon, the previously asked question was read 
9 aloud by the reporter in open court:) 
10 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
11 Q. (By Mr. Marson) Did you hear what you said? 
12 A. (Nodding) 
13 Q. That's you. You went on down the stairs. He was 
14 on the stairs. vlhat happened, Bryson? 
15 ~ And we tasted it, and we felt it. 
1G Q. Okay. Now, who is dmvn there, Bryson? Nere all 
17 the children do1vn there? l'lho was down there? 
18 A. All of us. 
19 Q. "All of us"? \-lho was "they"? 
20 A. Becky and Kirk and Anson and me. 
21 Q. And you. And Becky is your friend? 
,, '. 
I,. 
i 
2> 11. She lives next door to me. 
25 Q. Next door to you? 
2G A. Yes. 
'!.7 Q. And is Becky's mom here? 
2~ A. No. 
2~ Q. Is she outside of the court? Did you see her to-
:1o clay? 
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1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. The tall lady? 
3 A. Yeah. 
4 Q. Okay. Now, you went down to the stairs and he 
5 said "Taste it." What happened? 
6 A. I tasted it. 
7 Q. You tasted "it." vlhat? l•lhen you say that what 
3 are you talking about, Dryson? 
9 A. Went downstairs and we tasted it. 
10 Q. Who is •.,.,e"? 
11 A. We felt it. Then Kirk didn't get to, so then~ 
12 went upstairs. Then Kirk did, and then \ve all went back 
13 downstairs and -..-.~., ':: outside. 
14 Q. Okay. Let me--can I backtrack just a little bit 
15 Bryson? \vould that be okay? 
16 11. Yes. 
11 Q. Downstairs you say "we tasted it;" right? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Who is "we"? Who are you talking about? 
20 11. All of us. 
21 Q. "All of us"? 
22 A. Yes. 
) ,: 
A. Becky and Kirk dnd illlSUll dlld llk'. 
25 Q. Okay. Now, when you say "it;" what did you tast 
26 A. His weenie. 
27 Q. His weenie? 
28 A. Yes. 
29 Q. Did you do anything (:lsc· to it'! 
:w A. Then we felt it. 
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~ Did Becky do that? 
2 A. Yeah, all of us did it. Then Kirk didn't get to, 
3 so he went back upstairs and did it. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A 
Q. 
Kirk didn't get to do it at that time? 
Yeah. 
He didn't? 
Ye.,h. 
When did he do it? 
MR. JOHNSTON: Objection to that. That's leading. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. The objection is overruled. 
Q. 
A. 
~ 
(By Hr. Harson) When did Kirk do it? 
When he went upstairs. 
Okay. And then you went outside. lfiho went out-
14 side of the house? 
15 
1G 
17 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
All of us. 
"All of us"? Did someone call you to go outside? 
No, we just--he just said we was going to go out-
18 side now, so we went outside. And Anson told Becky's 
19 --Becky's mom. 
20 
21 
24 
2G 
d ic1 
Q. 
A. 
:·::(. 
Becky's mom? 
Yes. 
';-.·,·;._ l._l'o:•. 1 ::.:J~-~:.:0, 
TilE COUHT: The objection is sustained. 
A. 
~ 
you 
A. 
Q 
A. 
That--. (By the witness) 
(By Hr. !-larson) Don't say that, Bryson. Now, 
meet Becky's mom right then? 
Yes. 
\"/11!' r<' did you go? 
\'/l' II t CJVCl to our--Becky's--our house. 
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1 Q. You mean the Jack house where your mom and ~ad 
2 live? 
A. 3 Yes. 
4 And who did you see when you w2nt there? Q. 
A. 
6 And did you go anywhere later on, a little bit Q. 
7 later in that day? 
8 A. Yes--yeah. 
9 Q. Where did you go? 
10 A. Went down to the Bookmobile. 
11 Q. tvho did you go with? 
12 A. Hy mom. 
13 Q. \~ho else? 
14 A. And Becky and Kirk's mom. 
15 Q. And Becky and Kirk's mom? Were there any other 
16 children there; do you remember? 
17 A. Anson. 
18 Q. Now, did your mom ask you about this man? 
19 A. Yes, she said, "Is that the man?" I said, "Yes. 
20 MR. JOHNSTON: Objection to that and request it be 
21 stricken, your Honor. 
I 
~-;I 
24 
THE COfl!<T: \ll•ll-·-. 
I:.: l.; :-j·',] ( ·, \_:.'. 
THE COURT: I think you ought to lay a foundation as 
25 to identification, please. 
26 MR. f.1ARSON: Your Honor, this wi lness cannot identify 
~7 the defendant. 
28 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
29 MR. HARSON: He's just--okay. NoH, dir: you point a Jl\c 
:!0 out to your mom at that time? 
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·---------------.-...... 
11. Yes. 
2 Q. (By tlr. Marson) And why did you point that man 
3 out, Bryson? 
4 A. Because ~y mom told ~e which man it was, and I 
5 pointed it out. 
6 
7 
d 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1G 
17 
18 
19 
Is 
you 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
that 
A. 
Q. 
were 
HR. 
THC 
Q. 
20 \vcenic? 
21 A. 
You pointed it out? 
Yes. 
Okay. \·las thd t the I:ldn th~t t did it? 
Yes. 
Are you sure? 
Yes. 
Okay. Now, let me ask you a few more questions. 
okay, Bryson? 
·Yeah. 
Downstairs when Becky and Anson and Kirk and you, 
downstairs, did you see Becky lick his weenie? 
JOHNSTON: Objection to that, your Honor. 
COURT: Objection sustained to the question. 
(By Mr. Marson) What did you see Becky do to his 
Taste it. 
22 ~1R. ,10!!c:STON: Objection to that also, your Honor. 
28 
:IQ 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
(By nr-. Henson) What did you sec Anson do? 
Then Anson did it. 
What did he do? 
Tasted it and felt it. 
What did you do? 
Then I Lasted it and felt it. 
!I0\·1 dicl it taste? Go ahead; what did you say? 
32 
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----------------------
1 A. I was scared to say nothing. 
2 Q. Okay. Thank you. No further questions. Mr. 
3 Johnston is going to ask you a few questions. Do you 1-1ar· 
4 a drink of water or something? 
5 A. (By the witness) No, thank you. 
6 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. JOHNSTON: 
8 Q. Bryson, you indicated that you go to school. 
9 Could you tell me what school you go to? 
10 A. I go to Monte Vista. 
11 Q. And do you know what month it is now, Bryson? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. And do you know what month it was--. 
14 HR. MARSON: Objection to this line of questioning. 
15 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
16 MR. JOHNSTON: Do you know what month it was, Brysoo. 
17 when the things about--that you just told the Court about, 
18 do you know when that was? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. (By Mr. Johnston) vlhat time of day Has it, Brys 
21 A. It was at this day that 1-1e \vent over to the hous 
22 Q. 
A. 
24 Q. It wasn't in the fall? 
25 A. No. 
26 Q. It wasn't in the summertime? 
'1.1 A. No. 
28 Q. And how many brothers; do you have, Hry~;on? 
29 A. I have two. 
:!0 Q. Do you have any sisters? 
-------- --------- --------------
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
old. 
II. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
n. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I have one little baby sister only five mont 
And you're in Kindergarten; is that right, Bryson? 
Yes. 
I see. And what grade is your brother in? 
I don't know. 
~nd what qra~c is your sister in? 
I don't have a big sister. 
Do you have a little sister? 
Yes. 
How long have you been in school, Bryson? 
For two months. 
Bryson, can you tell me what time of day it was 
14 on the day that these things happened that you just talked 
15 about? 
1G 
11 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
\•/hen was that? 
That was in February. 
All right. Your Honor, at this time I would move 
20 to strike Bryson's testimony on the grounds that the exami-
21 nation he has just responded to would indicate that he simpl 
i L· 
" f' t ". 
~4 of bel icf. 
~:; lie docs not understand the time of year, the months, 
U and I would submit the testimony should be stricken for that 
Z7 reason. 
29 
TilE COUHT: The objeclion is overruled. 
0 
II. 
(lly tlr. Johnston) 
Yes. 
Bryson, do you go to church? 
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1 Q. What church do you go to? 
2 A. Go down to the church. 
3 (). Okay. Are you a ~ember of a religion? 
4 Jl.. Yes. 
5 Q. What religion are you a member of? 
6 Jl.. My teacher. 
7 Q. Your teacher? 
8 Jl.. _Yes. 
9 Q. Do you know what religion you're a member of? 
10 Jl.. No. 
11 Q. How often do you go to church, son? 
12 Jl.. Just every day. 
13 Q. Every day? 
14 Jl.. After school. 
15 Q. Every day after school? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Bryson, you've told the Judge that you tasted 
18 somebody's weenie. 
19 
20 
21 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Jl.. 
Q. 
A. 
' "· 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I know. 
Now, that isn't true; is it, Bryson? 
Uh-uh. 
Uh -u:1; rt J ~ 
It isn't true; is it, son? 
Uh-uh. 
I have nothing further. 
REDI HECT- EX.I\Wf Nll'l'ION 
BY MR. MAJ{SON: 
Q. Bryson, did you say that nccky tasted the man's 
:10 weenie? 
L--------------------···--·--- ------ ----- -------
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Did that happen? 
Yes. 
You just--and did you taste the man's weenie? 
Yes. 
Okay. You just told that man--what did you tell 
7, t 1t,t t n:1~: :i u . ~: ct scco:td a1o Hilc•n hco asked you did you taste 
8 the weenie? What did you mean? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1G 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
24 
25 
2ti 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I meant--. 
What happened? 
Kirk didn't get to. 
Kirk didn't get to; did he? Did you? 
Yes. 
Did you tell someone how it tasted? 
No. 
No. How did it taste; do you remember? 
No. 
Don't remember? 
No. 
But did you taste it? 
Yes. 
Your tongue? 
Yes. 
! L \ 
Point your tongue out? You're sticking your 
27 ton<JU<' out? 
A. 
0 
1\. 
Yes. 
rs th,ll 1vhat. you used to taste the man's weenie? 
Yes. 
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1 Q. You sure of that? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. JOHNSTON: 
6 Q. Bryson--
7 A. 
8 Q. --it's true, isn't it, that you didn't taste the 
9 man's weenie? 
10 MR. MARSON: Your Honor, could I ask 1'1r. Johnston to 
11 rephrase that qu"'s+:ion? I understand this is cross-exarni-
12 nation, but conceptually we're dealing with a difficult 
13 type of question; "It's true, isn't it." If we could be 
M rather straightforward with this child I think it would ~ 
15 helpful. 
16 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
17 Q. (By Mr. Johnston) That's true; isn't it? 
18 A. Uh-uh. 
19 HR. MARSON: Your Honor, I'd like to object again. 
20 THE ,COURT: The objection as to the form of the ques-
n tion will be sustained. 
1'\: 
Bryson. 
24 Q. (By Mr. Johnston) Bryson--
25 A. What? 
26 Q. --Becky didn't taste the wccnic; did she? 
A. Uh-uh. 
Q. She didn't, now; did slw, Bryson') 
A. No. 
:m 
'------
MR. tJI.ARSON: Your Honor, again, I w j s h he could be -----
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struightforwurd. I don't think the child understands the 
2 two double negatives. He's saying yes to the fact that she 
3 did. 
4 THE COURT: Rephrase the question, please. 
5 Q. (By Mr. Johnston) Bryson--
6 A. lvhat? 
7 --Becky didn't taste the weenie; did she? 
8 A. No. 
HR. l1ARSON: Again same objection, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: The objection will be sustained to the 
11 form of the question, Hr. Johnston. 
12 MR. MARSON: Ask the answer be stricken under the cir-
13 cumstances; a reasking of the same question. 
14 THE COURT: The answer may stand. 
15 1-IR. JOHNSTON: I have nothing further. 
1G }IR. MARSON: No further questions. Your Honor--. 
17 THE COURT: Court will be in recess until 2:00. 
18 (Whereupon, at the hour of 12:10 p.M., court stood in 
19 noon recess; after which, at the hour of 2:30p.m., the 
W following proceedings were had in open court in the pres-
21 enco and hearing of the defendant:) 
J. ~11~7. Tho r~cord may 
,l ,_, '-- ""-~;!~7-f:·l.. 'i'ltc 
24 State's represented. 
25 MR. JOHNSTON: Before we start, your Honor, may I re-
~ guest the Court to ask if these gentlemen are going to be 
~7 witnesses in the matter? Are you going to be witnesses? 
~H ThclllL you. 
TilE COURT: I ac;o,ume that if they were going to be wit-
;!() nc~;·;c·~; t IH·y 1;oulcl l>L' excluded. Go ahead. 
- ·- ---- - ----------------' 1R 
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